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Researchers in social cognition increasingly realize that many phenomena cannot be
understood by investigating offline situations only, focusing on individual mechanisms and
an observer perspective. There are processes of dynamic emergence specific to online
situations, when two or more persons are engaged in a real-time interaction that are
more than just the sum of the individual capacities or behaviors, and these require the
study of online social interaction. Auvray et al.’s (2009) perceptual crossing paradigm offers
possibly the simplest paradigm for studying such online interactions: two persons, a one-
dimensional space, one bit of information, and a yes/no answer. This study has provoked
a lot of resonance in different areas of research, including experimental psychology,
computer/robot modeling, philosophy, psychopathology, and even in the field of design.
In this article, we review and critically assess this body of literature. We give an overview
of both behavioral experimental research and simulated agent modeling done using the
perceptual crossing paradigm. We discuss different contexts in which work on perceptual
crossing has been cited. This includes the controversy about the possible constitutive role
of perceptual crossing for social cognition. We conclude with an outlook on future research
possibilities, in particular those that could elucidate the link between online interaction
dynamics and individual social cognition.
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INTRODUCTION
It is the advent of the interactionist turn in social cognition. It is
becoming more and more evident that research cannot be limited
to investigating offline situations, where individual mechanisms
to process social situations are looked at in isolation. There are
social processes specific to online situations, i.e., when two per-
sons are engaged in real-time interaction, and these processes are
essential for an understanding of social interaction. As an illustra-
tive example of how dynamics of interaction can be determined
by the interaction process, rather than by the goals and actions
of any of the interactors, De Jaegher (2009) describes a situa-
tion where two people try to walk past each other in a narrow
corridor. It can happen that both people step toward the same
side, readjust and step toward the other side, and subsequently
engage repeatedly in such synchronized mirroring of sideways
steps. In such a case, the process of interaction continues even
if none of the interactors want to remain in interaction. There
is thus a coordination of synchronized sideways movements in
which the two peoples’ behaviors are adjusted as a function of
the evolving dynamics of the interaction. In other words, there
are aspects of the dyadic system that cannot be assigned to any
of the interacting entities. It remains to be seen how impor-
tant such interaction processes are for social cognition. What
is clear, however, is that traditional approaches in social cogni-
tion that study an individual’s reaction to social stimuli offline
are unable to capture this kind of interaction dynamics in the
first place.
The importance of online interaction for the recognition of
others has been illustrated by Murray and Trevarthen (1985). In
their studies, 2-month-old infants interacted with their mothers
via a double-video projection. The video, displayed to the infants,
could either present their mother interacting with them in real-
time or a video pre-recorded from a previous interaction. The
infants engaged in coordination with the video only when inter-
action was live, whereas they showed signs of distress if the video
was pre-recorded. The fact that the children were able to distin-
guish a live interaction with their mother from a pre-recorded one
suggests that the recognition of another person does not only con-
sist of the simple recognition of a particular shape or pattern of
movements, but also involves a property intrinsic to the shared
perceptual activity: The perception of how the other’s movements
are related to our own.
Auvray et al.’s (2009) perceptual crossing paradigm provides
the most basic conditions for studying the factors involved in rec-
ognizing others in online interactions. In the experiment, pairs
of blindfolded human participants were placed in separate rooms
and interacted in a common virtual one-dimensional perceptual
space (see Figure 1). Each participant moved a cursor (an avatar
representing her body) along a line using a computer mouse and
received a tactile stimulus to the free hand when encountering
something on the line. The participants were asked to click the
mouse button when they perceived the presence of the other
participant. Apart from each other, participants could encounter
a static object or a displaced “shadow image” of the partner.
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic illustration of Auvray et al.’s (2009) experimental set-up.
Note that this shadow image was strictly identical with respect
to shape and movement characteristics. Therefore, the only dif-
ference between the partner and their shadow image is that the
former can at the same time perceive and be perceived, i.e.,
that there can be live dyadic interactions. A solution to the task
has to rely at least partially on performing and detecting a live
interaction.
Participants were able to perform this task well, i.e., they
clicked significantly more often whenmeeting the partner’s avatar
(65.9% of the clicks ± S.D. of 13.9) than when meeting the
shadow image (23.0% ± 10.4) or the static object (11.0 ± 8.9%).
The paradigm thus provides sufficient conditions for perceptual
processes that are sensitive to social contingency like Murray and
Trevarthen’s (1985) study.
Analysis of the sources of tactile stimulation revealed an asym-
metry: the majority of the stimuli were caused by encounters
with the partner’s avatar (52.2% ± 11.8 of the received stim-
uli) followed by the static object (32.7% ± 11.8) and the shadow
image (15.2% ± 6.2). Surprisingly, this implies that the rela-
tive recognition rate, i.e., the ratio of clicks per type of object
divided by stimulations per type of object, does not differ between
the mobile object and the interaction partner: There are 1.26
clicks per stimulation by the partner’s avatar and 1.51 for the
shadow image, a difference that is not significant. Only the static
object with 0.33 clicks per stimulation differs. Participants are
ca. four times more likely to click after having met a mobile
object than after having encountered the static object. The higher
proportion of correct clicks when meeting the other is, there-
fore, not due to an individual ability to recognize the partner
as participants are equally likely to click after encountering the
shadow as they are when they encounter the other. There is no
conscious recognition of the other in terms of this click rate.
The correct discrimination emerges instead from the interaction
dynamics, as a consequence of the mutual search for one another
which make the encounters between the two participants farmore
frequent.
In explaining the result that participants predominantly click
when meeting their partner, there are thus two kinds of processes
to account for: the participants’ ability to click after touching
mobile objects but not after touching the fixed object; and the
fact that the perceptual crossing with the other was far more fre-
quent than encounters with the shadow image which explains
why participants had 65.9% correct responses even though their
relative click rate was identical for the shadow and the other. A
closer examination of the results indicated that participants used
a strategy of reversing their direction of movement after a sen-
sory encounter; there is a strong negative correlation (r = −0.72)
between the mean acceleration after losing contact and the mean
velocity before making contact. This strategy results in oscillatory
movement around the source of stimulation, an observation con-
sistent with previous studies with such minimalist visuo-tactile
feedback devices (Stewart and Gapenne, 2003; Sribunruangrit
et al., 2004). According to Lenay et al. (2003) this strategy and
the successive stimulation events it brings about give rise to the
perception of a spatially localized object.
The participants’ ability to distinguish between fixed and
moving objects could be based on a number of differences in
sensorimotor events. These are the following. A change in stimu-
lation occurs although the participants themselves did not move
(this criterion accounts for 54.9% of clicks). Participants expe-
rienced two distinct consecutive stimuli even though they have
been moving monotonically in a constant direction (32.3%).
They experienced a smaller (31.3%) or larger (9.1%) width than
the objects’ stationary size. The next three types of event occur
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when the participants leave a source of stimulation and then
reverse direction to relocate this source of stimulation. If the stim-
ulation is not, as the participants expected, due to a fixed object,
they will encounter the stimulation again sooner (14.4%) or later
(14.7%) than expected, or not at all (11.6%).These criteria are
not mutually exclusive and may have been used in combination.
Detecting these subtle differences in sensorimotor patterns is a
task up to the individual.
The more frequent stimulation of the participant due to a
perceptual crossing with the other results from the oscillatory
scanning strategy employed. When a participant encounters the
partner, both participants receive tactile stimulation, and revers-
ing the direction of their movement, they engage in the same
oscillatory behavior. This co-dependence of the two perceptual
activities thus forms a relatively stable dynamic configuration.
In this situation, the perceptual activities mutually attract each
other, just as in everyday situations, when two people catch each
other’s eye. By contrast, when a participant encounters the other’s
shadow image, she is the only one receiving stimulation and
subsequently reversing her direction. This does not allow a sta-
ble interaction. Importantly, the correct solution in this instance
results from performing the live interaction itself. The coupling of
two individuals employing the more general perceptual strategy
to oscillate around a source of stimulation leads to the emer-
gence of stable interaction. As the individual click rates show,
no individual discrimination between the other and her shadow
image is detected by the individual alone. The online interac-
tion and emergent coordination provides the participants with
the distinction between the shadow and the other for free. This
occurs without the need for consciously detecting differences in
the available sensorimotor patterns. The results, therefore, pro-
vide an example how interactive processes (that individual-based
approaches would be blind to) can serve a functional role in
solving a perceptual task.
EXTENSIONS ANDMODELS OF THE PARADIGM
Auvray et al.’s (2009) study has provoked a lot of resonance in
different areas of research. These range from experimental and
clinical psychology to computer/robot modeling, philosophy, and
even engineering and design. Due to its simplicity, the percep-
tual crossing paradigm serves as an illustrative example for the
importance of online interaction dynamics. This section surveys
the body of literature emerging as a result of the perceptual cross-
ing paradigm, starting with a section on empirical work, before
covering follow-up computational models. In addition, Table 1
lists and summarizes the most important studies in perceptual
crossing.
FURTHER EXPERIMENTS ON PERCEPTUAL CROSSING
In order to test whether these results generalize to richer envi-
ronments, Lenay et al. (2011) tested a two-dimensional version
of the original experiment. Ten pairs of participants were placed
in a two-dimensional virtual space. Apart from differences in the
size of objects and environment, the set-up and protocol were
the same as in the original experiment. Quantitatively speaking,
the results were similar, i.e., a very successful identification of the
other in terms of percentage of clicks assigned to the different
types of objects. Similarly, there was again an equal click rate per
stimulation for the partners and their shadow image, showing
that successful distinction between the other and the shadow is
due to frequency of stimulation from each source. The emphasis
of this extension was, however, on qualitative properties of motor
behavior. How would participants implement this task in two
dimensions? Lenay et al. (2011) report that, while participants
scanned the entire space in search for one another, once con-
tact was established, they reverted to one-dimensional oscillatory
interactions. Further analysis of active perceptual strategies was
informed by results from robot simulations of the task (Rohde
and Di Paolo, 2008; Rohde, 2010; Lenay et al., 2011; cf Section
“Robot Simulation Models”), i.e., patterns of behavior observed
in the robotic agents were tested against the human data. There
is evidence that a possible functional role of oscillatory scanning
is to relocalize the other after losing touch. This is in agree-
ment with the idea that oscillations serve to spatially localize a
source of stimulation. Evidence also suggests that a “surprise,”
i.e., the impossibility to precisely predict the location of the other
despite coordinated interaction, can explain the clicking behav-
ior, as was previously suggested by Auvray et al. (2009). It should
be mentioned that it remains unclear whether the reduction of
movement to one dimension is related to the anatomy of the
human arm, as no postural variables were recorded and there is
considerable variability in preferred oscillation direction across
subjects.
Another variation on the paradigm was studied by Iizuka et al.
(2009, 2012a) who empirically tested an issue that had previously
been studied in simulation (Iizuka and DiPaolo, 2007; Di Paolo
et al., 2008; cf. Section “Robot Simulation Models”), i.e., agency
detection in an environment, where one-sided coordination (De
Jaegher, 2009) is a theoretical possibility. In the original percep-
tual crossing paradigm, one-sided coordination with the other’s
shadow image cannot stabilize. Due to the spatial arrangement of
the different entities on the tape, if one participant interacts with
the other’s lure, this implies that the other person is still searching
for her partner. Thus, even when not interacting, the participants
will influence each other’s behavior. Iizuka et al. (2009, 2012a)
introduced an important change to the original perceptual cross-
ing paradigm. Instead of simultaneously placing a person and her
shadow image into the virtual world, trials were randomized to
either expose participants to a live interaction (possibility for two-
sided coordination) or to a recording of the other participant’s
behavior in a previous live interaction trial (possibility for one-
sided coordination). Participants had to decide at the end of a
trial whether they had perceived the interaction to be live. With
this change in the paradigm, participants initially have difficul-
ties to distinguish the two kinds of trials. All of them start off
scanning and oscillating around the encountered entities of both
types. However, after only a few tens of trials, the participants
developed a turn-taking behavior as an active probing strategy.
Turn-taking was quantified as the amount to which dyads relied
on a behavioral strategy where, at any point in time, just one inter-
action partner was moving while the other one was standing still,
rather than both moving simultaneously. However, only 4 out of
those 10 dyads achieved above chance level performance on the
task using the turn-taking strategy.
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Table 1 | Summary of the most important experimental and modeling studies on perceptual crossing.
Studies Methods Questions Results
Auvray et al., 2009 Human behavior (VR) Self-organization of coordination Coordination arises despite individual’s incapac-
ity to explicitly discriminate live versus non-live
interaction
Di Paolo et al., 2008; Rohde,
2010; ch. 6
Simulation modeling Mechanisms underlying PC Behavior observed in PC can emerge from simple
behavioral control circuits in online interaction
Iizuka and DiPaolo, 2007;
Di Paolo et al., 2008; Iizuka
et al., 2009, 2012a
Human behavior (VR),
simulation modeling
Individual modulation of
interaction to discriminate
online interaction from a
recording
Simulated agents as well as individuals use active
perceptual strategies and turn-taking to discrimi-
nate live interaction from one-sided coordination
Martius et al., 2008 Simulation modeling Emergence of coordination in
homeokinetic agents
If rewarded for seeking stimulation, PC, and
agency detection emerge from homeokinetic con-
trol rule
Rohde and Di Paolo, 2008;
Rohde, 2010; ch. 7;
(Lenay et al., 2011)
Human behavior (VR) and
simulation modeling
PC in 2D; embodiment and
spatial properties
The results from PC in 1D transfer to 2D; oscilla-
tory interaction persists and may serve exact local-
ization; humans perceive entities whose location
cannot be fully predicted as other agents
Froese and Di Paolo, 2008,
2010, 2011
Simulation modeling Dynamic stability and
mechanisms underlying PC
Coordination in PC paradigm is stable across many
scenarios. Evolved solutions rely on subtleties in
brain-body-environment interaction dynamics
Timmermans et al., 2011 Human behavior (VR) with
autistic patients
Differences and similarities
between autistic and
non-autistic people
Similar motor behavior and coordination patterns.
Small differences in failed clicks
Iizuka et al., 2012b Human behavior (VR) Emergence of symbolic
communication through
interaction
With training, humans develop turn-taking strate-
gies and characteristic movements to represent
different kinds of visual stimuli to the interaction
partner in a PC experiment
Lenay and Stewart, 2012 Human behavior (VR) Conscious recognition of the
source of stimulation
Human classify the sources of stimulation if these
are characterized by different sounds
Lenay and Stewart, 2012 Human behavior (VR) Slow modulation of fast PC
dynamics
Humans can negotiate a common distance
between sensor and avatar in PC using the inter-
action as feedback to improve interaction
The important difference with Auvray et al.’s (2009) per-
ceptual crossing paradigm is that the procedure used in Iizuka
et al.’s (2009, 2012a) experiment renders a one-sided coordination
solution theoretically possible. In other words, it allows a situ-
ation where coordination occurs but is to be fully credited to
one interaction partner. This translates Murray and Trevarthen’s
(1985) double TV monitor paradigm more faithfully into a min-
imal virtual environment but also tackles a slightly different
scientific question. Indeed, Auvray et al.’s (2009) focus was on the
kind of environments and behaviors that lead to the emergence
of social coordination, whereas Iizuka et al. (2009, 2012a) focus
on how an individual can modulate the interaction dynamics to
figure out if an interaction is live or not. This difference in moti-
vation relates to our discussion of whether perceptual crossing
constitutes social cognition in Section “Does Perceptual Crossing
Constitute Social Cognition?”.
The emergence of symbolic communication without dedicated
signaling channels was studied by Iizuka et al. (2012b) in another
variant of the perceptual crossing paradigm. Pairs of participants
were confronted with different visual stimuli (shapes) and had to
decide after 30 s of perceptual crossing whether they saw the same
or a different shape (at first there were two possible shapes, later
three). Initially, performance was at chance level and participants
engaged only in perceptual crossing. Yet, with the feedback pro-
vided, participants learned not only to take turns in interaction,
but also to negotiate characteristic motion patterns to represent
the shape they could see, e.g., by a characteristic oscillation fre-
quency. What is particularly interesting in this instance is that
the same sensorimotor coupling afforded by the experimental
set-up serves several functions. Oscillatory movement is used to
localize the other, to communicate, and to negotiate a common
vocabulary. All of these activities are distinguishable, functional
processes, yet they all occur concurrently.
In another interesting elaboration on the original paradigm,
Lenay and Stewart (2012) tested the extent to which participants
are able to explicitly recognize their partner. To do so, participants
received feedback sounds instead of tactile feedback. Each sound
was associated with one of the three kinds of objects, i.e., the part-
ner’s avatar, the shadow image, and the fixed object. Ten pairs
of participants were tested in 4 sessions and the mapping from
sounds to entities was randomized for each session. In sessions 1
and 2, the moving object had the same rule of displacement as in
the original experiment, i.e., located at a fixed distance from the
partner’s avatar. In sessions 3 and 4, it corresponded instead to
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the recordings of the partner’s trajectory during session 2. At the
end of each session, participants were asked to assign the tones to
the different kinds of entities. The results revealed a very high and
statistically significant ability to recognize the fixed object. The
participants’ ability to distinguish between partner and mobile
object is less conclusive: Overall, the participants were able to dis-
tinguish between the two in the two sessions where the mobile
objects corresponded to a pre-recording; however, they were only
able to do so in one out of the two sessions when it corresponded
to a shadow image.
A number of interesting observations emerged from the study.
Firstly, there was a non-significant trend for participants’ perfor-
mance to correlate, suggesting that certain types of interaction
ease the assignment for both parties alike. In addition, a com-
mon strategy to solve the task could be observed. Participants
first identified the sound corresponding to the fixed object. They
subsequently sought the partner’s avatar, trying to stay in contact
with it. In a final step, they verified their assignment by tracing
the mobile object. This shift in strategy from that observed in the
original perceptual crossing paradigm (Auvray et al., 2009) indi-
cates, in line with the results by Iizuka et al. (2009, 2012a), that
conscious recognition requires the modulation of the perceptual
crossing dynamics emerging from mutual search. It also suggests
that such a modified strategy and characteristic feedback sounds
are necessary to identify the source of stimulation. This concurs
with the conclusion from the original study (Auvray et al., 2009)
that the discrimination between the other and the shadow image
does not involve conscious recognition. During debriefing, par-
ticipants reported sessions 3 and 4 (interaction with a recording)
harder, because the recording appeared “more human,” moved
more, appeared to react more to contacts, and to imitate the oscil-
lation pattern. This is in agreement with the results of Iizuka
et al. (2009, 2012a) that reported increased difficulty in discrim-
inating one-sided coordination with a recording of a previous
interaction, as opposed to live online interaction.
Another study (Lenay and Stewart, 2012) investigated whether
participants are able to modulate their sensorimotor couplings to
ease perceptual crossing. The one-dimensional environment con-
tained only the two partners. In this variation of the paradigm,
participants could adjust the distance between their receptive
field and their corresponding avatar (perceptible by the other).
The initial distances between the participant’s receptive field and
avatar at the beginning of a trial varied from trial to trial. Distance
could be adjusted using mouse-clicks during perceptual crossing.
If both participants agreed on the same distance, this corresponds
to the setting in the original paradigm (Auvray et al., 2009). If
there is a discrepancy in these distances between participants,
the crossing would be expected to drift to one direction given
the described oscillatory strategy. If the discrepancy is very large,
coordination would be expected not to stabilize. The participants’
task was to adjust the distance between their avatar and the recep-
tive field to decrease any drift experienced and stabilize perceptual
crossing. It was found that, using the interaction dynamics as a
feedback signal, participants were able to decrease the discrep-
ancy between their distance parameters and thus, over time, to
modulate the wiring of their sense organs to achieve smoother
interaction.
A different line of experimentation was pursued by
Timmermans et al. (2011), who investigate perceptual crossing
in High Functioning Autists (HFAs). Their aim was to determine
the level at which HFAs have impaired social abilities. While
some scientists claim that autistic people have problems with
automatic aspects of social cognition (e.g., McIntosh et al., 2006
report a deficit in automatic mimicry), other studies find no
impairment in autists in cognitive faculties that involve implicit
social cognition, such as action representation (Sebanz et al.,
2005) or implicit learning (Brown et al., 2010). By studying
HFAs in the perceptual crossing paradigm, it is possible to test
whether autistic people have difficulty in coordinating online
interactions, or their conscious perception of such interactions.
If the coordination capacities of HFAs are less strong, there
should be relatively less stimulation by the interaction partner.
If, however, the individual processing is impaired, there should
be a decreased ability to distinguish the fixed object from the
partner and shadow image in terms of click rate. Fifteen pairs of
participants were tested in the perceptual crossing paradigm; in
eight of these pairs, one interaction partner was a HFA, the other
seven pairs consisted of two healthy controls. There were no sig-
nificant differences in motor behavior or coordination patterns
between the two groups: most of the encounters occurred with
the interaction partner. Thus, HFAs appear not be impaired at
the levels of social interaction that are required for coordination
in the perceptual crossing paradigm. In terms of frequency of
clicks, unlike the original study (Auvray et al., 2009), there are so
far no significant differences between the three types of objects
in either group. Thus, apart from the reliable emergence of
perceptual crossing interaction, whether or not there are more
specific differences in how HFAs and healthy controls interact
will require further analysis and experiments.
Beside these direct variations and extensions, the perceptual
crossing paradigm has also informed research in different dis-
ciplines. In the field of design, Marti (2010) draws inspiration
from the perceptual crossing paradigm in order to develop inter-
active devices capable of a mutual regulation of joint actions. The
robot companion Iromec has been developed for the purpose of
engaging with children with different disabilities. In one of the
scenarios presented in the article, the robot companion follows
a child at a fixed distance taking the same trajectory, pace, and
speed as the child. If however, another person comes closer to
the robot, it will subsequently follow the new person until the
child again comes closer to it. The author tested such a scenario
with a 9-year-old child who had a mild cognitive disability involv-
ing attentional difficulties and delays in learning. Analyzing the
video-recordings, the child’s teachers agreed that the child was
remarkably able to sustain activity across a number of tasks, sug-
gesting that his capacity to focus attention was better than usual.
The author shows how the lessons learned from the perceptual
crossing experiment can be used in the design of technological
artifacts to improve the motivation to act, attention to mobility,
coordination, and basic interpersonal interaction.
Ware (2011) was inspired by the perceptual crossing experi-
ments to investigate social interactions in pigeons with a method
similar to that of Murray and Trevarthen (1985). A double
closed-circuit teleprompter apparatus enabled two birds located
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in different rooms to interact in real-time via a video interface.
Pigeons’ courtship behaviors was studied, which is reflected in
how much they walk in circles. The courtship behavior of 12
pigeons (six males and six females) was compared when they
viewed a real-time video of each of the opposite sex partner versus
a recorded video of previous interaction with those same part-
ners. The results revealed an effect of the interactive condition
(live versus playback) on pigeons’ courtship behaviors. Additional
experiments investigated the temporal and spatial details of how
live interaction benefits courtship behavior in pigeons. The results
demonstrated that pigeons’ circle walking behavior also decreased
when a 9-s delay was introduced, as compared with the live con-
dition. There was no effect of viewing angle: The pigeons behaved
similarly when their partner faced the camera versus when it was
displayed rotated 90◦ away during a live interaction and their
interactive circle walking behavior reduced in the two cases when
viewing a playback video. It should be noted that differences
in circle walking behaviors during playback versus live condi-
tions only appear during courtship (two pigeons of opposite sex)
but not during rivalry (two pigeons of the same sex). Ware’s
results thus reveal that pigeons’ courtship behavior is not based
on visual signals only, but it is also influenced by sensitivity to
social contingencies existing between signals.
ROBOT SIMULATION MODELS
The perceptual crossing paradigm suggests itself for computa-
tional modeling by simulating embodied agents, given that it
takes place in a minimal virtual world. The experimental task
can only be solved in interaction, not through an abstract pro-
cessing/reasoning. Simulating the behavior in closed-loop agent-
agent interaction can reveal the possible mechanisms that could
underlie perceptual crossing in humans.
The first studies on computational modeling of the percep-
tual crossing paradigm were published by Di Paolo et al. (2008).
They used Evolutionary Robotics simulation modeling, a tech-
nique where simulated robots are parameterized in an automated
way to optimize performance in a task. Performance in a task is
measured by a “fitness function” that quantifies success in the
task (see Figure 2 for a cartoon illustration of how Evolutionary
Robotics works). For instance, a fitness function for the percep-
tual crossing task was to be maximally close to another agent over
the course of a simulated interaction within the virtual world also
used for humans (Figure 1). The parameters evolved were the
weights and biases of a recurrent neural control network that were
initially random. By removing those network controllers that did
not score high according to the fitness function, and copying the
successful ones with modifications to the next generation, the
FIGURE 2 | An illustration of the algorithm used in Evolutionary
Robotics. Random strings (“genomes”) are interpreted as parameters
for neural network robot control. Robot behavior is simulated and
evaluated. The higher scoring agents’ genome is recombined and
copied with mutations to seed the next generation. Over
thousands of repetitions of this cycle, behavior according to the
evaluation criterion (“fitness function”) is optimized (source: Rohde,
2010; ch. 3).
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neural controllers evolved (“learned”), over thousands of gen-
erations, to locate the other agent. Such Evolutionary Robotics
models, as well as other agent simulation models of the task,
do not strictly follow the scientific purpose to fit and describe a
data set. Instead they can be seen as idea generators and proofs
of concept, as the algorithm may come up with circuits that a
human engineer would not have come up with. Evolved solutions
typically exploit dynamical properties of the closed-loop agent-
environment system and are both simple and robust (cf., e.g.,
Rohde, 2010).
In the first simulation experiment (Di Paolo et al., 2008;
Rohde, 2010; ch. 6), agents were evolved to locate another iden-
tical agent in live interaction in a set-up analogous to that used
in Auvray et al. (2009). Circuitry to avoid the shadow image
evolved effortlessly. However, it turned out to be much more
difficult to get controllers to avoid the stationary object than
anticipated. This is because the anti-phase oscillations in which
agents interlocked when interacting appeared strikingly similar
to the one-directional scanning of a fixed object (see Figure 3):
A touch, followed by an inversion of movement direction, fol-
lowed by another touch, an another inversion, and so on. Only
subtle differences in the integrated time of stimulation over time
made it possible to make this distinction at all; the duration
of stimulation is shorter in interaction because the two agents
pass each other moving in opposite directions (Figure 3B). This
result sheds a new light on the results by Auvray et al. (2009).
In their study, the fixed lure accounts for a third of stimula-
tions (cf. Section “Introduction”), implying that humans spend
a considerable amount of time trying to figure out if the source of
stimulation is static or not. The cue ultimately used by the model,
i.e., a shorter duration of stimulation when crossing, accounts for
31.3% of human clicks as well. In summary, the evolved circuits
generate behavior that qualitatively accounts for every aspect of
the human behavior reported in Auvray et al. (2009), proving
that simple sensorimotor control circuitry embedded in online
interaction is sufficient to explain success in the task, without the
need to explicitly process social cues1. However, it should be noted
that another important cue available to humans, i.e., variability
of the exact position of the partner (cf. Lenay et al., 2011), is not
available to the simulated agents, as the two interacting agents are
always identical and there is no sensory or motor noise in the sim-
ulations; this means that their interactions are implausibly regular
(cf. Figure 2).
The difficulties agents and humans have in avoiding the fixed
lure demonstrates the difference that online interaction makes in
the study of social interaction and social cognition. Live inter-
action in the perceptual crossing paradigm may ease the task to
avoid the shadow image, as no stable interaction can be estab-
lished. This is contrary to our intuition that it should be difficult
to distinguish two entities that move exactly the same way. On the
1An even earlier simulation model of the task has been implemented by
Stewart and Lenay, but has never been published. These agents are controlled
by a hand-designed feedback circuit that inverts movement direction when
stimulated and are subject to inertial forces. The control law and behavior are
akin to those evolved in the Evolutionary Robotics simulations.
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FIGURE 3 | Simulated agents performing perceptual crossing (Di Paolo
et al., 2008; Rohde, 2010; ch. 6). (A) An example movement generated in
simulated interaction. The two agents (thick lines, gray and black)
subsequently interact, part, engage with the two kinds of distractor objects
(thin lines) and eventually find each other and lock in interaction. (B,C) Even
though from the observer perspective, interactions with another agent (B)
and with the stationary object (C) look very different (top panels), the
sensorimotor plots (sensor activation and motor outputs across time, bottom
panels) look strikingly similar. This reveals why discriminating the other and
the fixed objects is difficult for simulated agents.
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other hand, distinguishing another sensing, moving person from
a fixed object, a task that appears easy whenmerely thinking of the
stimulus properties offline, becomes more difficult in interaction,
as both stay in approximately the same place. Therefore, we have
to be sceptical about generalizing findings from offline paradigms
in the study of social cognition to live interaction contexts.
The second model (Di Paolo et al., 2008; see also Iizuka and
DiPaolo, 2007) tests—in silico—the experimental study that was
later put to the empirical test by Iizuka et al. (2009), i.e., the
possibility to distinguish a live interaction with a partner from
a recording of an earlier interaction with that same partner (see
Section “Further Experiments on Perceptual Crossing”). Agents
evolved to solve this problem by an active probing strategy, i.e.,
they performed step changes of position to test whether the other
agent follows them or not. In this scenario, discrimination is
down to the individual. Yet, the solution is also interactive, as
it relies on simple know-how rules of how to provoke a break-
down in one-sided interaction. The evolved controllers do not
process the inputs for signs of social contingency; they rely
on simple sensorimotor couplings. Even though the turn-taking
strategies observed in human participants performing the same
task is of a different nature, the underlying principle is the same:
Both humans and robots actively probe the stability of interac-
tion to assess whether they are dealing with another agent or
with a recording (Iizuka et al., 2009, 2012a; cf. Section “Further
Experiments on Perceptual Crossing”).
Froese and Di Paolo (2008, 2010, 2011) replicated and
extended these models, providing further analysis of the evolved
agents and changes to the paradigm. They could show that the
globally attractive properties of the experiment are extremely
robust (Froese and Di Paolo, 2008, 2010). Even when the agents
were re-wired to receive the perceptual inputs of the respective
others, perceptual crossing was established. In this scenario, the
tactile inputs did not provide any actual cues about the posi-
tion of any of the entities in the virtual world. Furthermore, they
tried to evolve agents to seek interaction with the shadow image.
However, agents always ended up in interaction with the other
agent, as it is difficult to escape from the coordination emerging
from the mutual search for one another. Finally, a more detailed
dynamical analysis showed that the dynamical neural network
controllers evolved for perceptual crossing, rely on both internal
state of the units and external relative positioning of the agent.
They exploit more subtle properties of the dynamic interaction
of the agents with one another and the environment than could
be captured with the simple feedback control circuit they test as a
competing model.
Froese and Di Paolo (2011) additionally evolved agents to
solve a variant of the task, where stimulation is limited to one
fixed size rectangular input upon contact. This variation of the
paradigm makes it impossible to distinguish the fixed object and
the other merely by integrating the time of stimulation, i.e., the
cue used in the first model of the task (Di Paolo et al., 2008;
Rohde, 2010; ch. 6). The results confirmed that agents can use
other cues than just size and velocity to find each other and
coordinate.
Martius et al. (2008) modeled the perceptual crossing
experiment with simulated agents that were controlled by a
homeokinetic controller. Homeokinesis consists of a simultaneous
maximisation of sensitivity to changes in inputs and predictabil-
ity of future sensory inputs. This rule means that an agent’s
motion should be maximally variable with changing inputs and
that behavior in the closed loop should be governed by rules of
sensorimotor contingency that the controller can learn. In their
variant of the task, the virtual world contained another agent
and its shadow image, but no fixed objects. Perceptual crossing
emerged from this simple control rule if an additional reward
term to seek stimulation was introduced. When tested with either
just another agent or a recording of a previous interaction, these
agents established perceptual crossing with the other agent but
not with the recording. Thus the homeokinetic control rule can
explain sensitivity to social contingency in the perceptual crossing
paradigm.
Rohde et al. (Rohde, 2010; ch. 7; Rohde and Di Paolo, 2008;
Lenay et al., 2011) also modeled the extension of the Auvray
et al.’s (2009) paradigm to a two-dimensional scenario described
in Section “Further Experiments on Perceptual Crossing.” Rohde
(2010) compared different agent bodies, i.e., a simulated arm,
a joystick rooted in Euclidean space and a wheeled agent to
compare commonalities and differences between agent bodies.
In two dimensions, it is not clear to what extent interactive
strategies are governed by principles of Euclidean space or of
joint space. The different agent bodies make evolution of one
or the other kind of solution more likely. A simulated arm
is more likely to operate in joint space; the joystick agent is
more likely to operate in Euclidean space; the small wheeled
agent is more likely to use navigational strategies that cannot
be transferred to the human. It was found that similar prin-
ciples governed all solutions. The agents reliably evolved two
sub-behavioral modes, one for exploration and one for interac-
tion. If they evolved to oscillate around a target, they were more
successful. Oscillation was reliably realized by just one of the two
motor outputs that reacts very fast. The second motor output
was used to modulate behavior on a slower time scale. Yet, the
geometry and quantitative properties of these solutions varied
with different agent bodies. Wheeled agents moved around in
circles, joystick agents scanned the two dimensional world in a
grid and arm agents moved along one of their joint axes. These
insights fed back into the analysis of human behavior described
in Section “Further Experiments on Perceptual Crossing.” Even
though the sub-modes of search and oscillatory interaction were
observed in humans, too (Lenay et al., 2011), only some could be
found to oscillate in a preferred direction as the simulated arm
agents did.
The described body of work on simulation models comple-
ments the experimental work with humans using the perceptual
crossing paradigm and its variants. The models confirm that
the behavior observed in humans can emerge in the absence
of any explicit social processing. The models have suggested
possible underlying mechanisms: Simple feedback rules; small
recurrent neural networks exploiting agent-environment inter-
action (Iizuka and DiPaolo, 2007; Di Paolo et al., 2008; Rohde,
2010; ch. 6 and 7; Froese and Di Paolo, 2011); homeokinetic for-
ward modeling (Martius et al., 2008) and model predictions were
tested against empirical data. New variations of the perceptual
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crossing paradigmwere tested in simulation (Iizuka and DiPaolo,
2007; Rohde and Di Paolo, 2008) and were implemented later
on (Iizuka et al., 2009, 2012a; Lenay et al., 2011). In this sense,
the modeling of perceptual crossing also makes an important
methodological point. There is an ongoing debate about whether
simple agent models can be useful for the study of human or
even non-human cognition (e.g., Kirsh, 1991) or whether such
modeling should have an explicit target organism and behavior
(Webb, 2009). The cross-fertilization of behavioral experiments
and simulated agent modeling in research on perceptual crossing
is, therefore, a case in point for the scientific benefits of this type
of minimal models (cf. Rohde, 2010). Anecdotically, it should be
mentioned that the model by Iizuka and DiPaolo (2007; Di Paolo
et al., 2008) that investigates perceptual crossing with a recording
was developed independent to the perceptual crossing paradigm
as a mere theoretical exercise. Only later, the parallels to Auvray
et al.’s (2009) perceptual crossing paradigm were revealed and
eventually led to follow-up experiments with humans (Iizuka
et al., 2009, 2012a).
The possibilities for future research are vast. More and more
researchers pick up on the results and take them further. For
instance, Wilkinson et al. (2011) are working on perceptual cross-
ing of eye-movements using the iCub robot platform, a branch of
research with potential relevance for studies on human perceptual
crossing of gaze (e.g., Pfeiffer et al., 2011; cf. Section “The Road
Ahead”).
WHAT DO THE RESULTS ON PERCEPTUAL CROSSING IMPLY?
Due to its compelling minimalism, the results from the percep-
tual crossing experiment have become a paradigmatic example
in promoting a turn toward more embodied and interactionist
approaches in the study of social cognition. In the context of such
passionate philosophical debates, it is not always clear where a
strict interpretation of the results ends and where a philosoph-
ical argument or opinion begins. Therefore, we want to discuss
different contexts in which the perceptual crossing experiment or
its extensions and models have been referred to and make this
line explicit, starting with listing a number of conclusions that we
endorse without further reservations. We will then focus on two
debates that require a more careful evaluation: The discussion of
whether perceptual crossing behavior constitutes social cognition
and the question of what perceptual crossing tells us about the
experience of affect.
WHAT CAN BE INFERRED FROM THE PERCEPTUAL CROSSING
PARADIGM
What the results on perceptual crossing presented in Auvray
et al. (2009) show, in their essence, is that, in dyadic interaction,
co-ordination of behavior can emerge from a mutual search of
interaction partners for one another, even in a severely impov-
erished virtual environment. Furthermore, the study reveals
that this emergent coordination produces successful detection
of agency even though, on an individual level (rate of clicks
per stimulation), humans cannot discriminate interacting and
non-interacting mobile stimuli. Simulation models of the task
(e.g., Di Paolo et al., 2008) demonstrate that this kind of behav-
ior can emerge from very simple agents without explicit social
reasoning in online interaction. These results, as well as the
modifications of the paradigm listed in Section “Extensions and
Models of the Paradigm” illustrate the importance of online
dynamical interaction in the study of human social interaction
and cognition. Perception, as well as decision-making, relies on
the active recruitment of the necessary information in inter-
action. This leads to emergent patterns of interaction behav-
ior (e.g., stable anti-phase synchronization of perceptual cross-
ing) that change the task in a way that makes comparison
with offline paradigms, where stimuli are passively processed,
impossible.
There are a number of further interpretations of the results
on perceptual crossing that can be endorsed without further
reservation:
• As a pioneering study that, even though still limited, proves,
and recognizes the importance of social contingency and/or
interactionist approaches (Pereira et al., 2008; De Jaegher,
2009; Cangelosi et al., 2010; De Jaegher et al., 2010; Schilbach,
2010; Gangopadhyay and Schilbach, 2012)
• As a proof that, even in simple environments, embodied and
embedded interaction can bring about coordination and/or
synchronisation (Cowley, 2008; McGann and De Jaegher,
2009; Niewiadomski et al., 2010; Prepin and Pelachaud,
2011a,b)
• As a demonstration that social coordination can be an
autonomous interaction process that cannot be reduced to the
sum of the individual intentions or behaviors (e.g., De Jaegher
and Di Paolo, 2007; Rohde and Stewart, 2008; Colombetti and
Torrance, 2009; De Jaegher and Froese, 2009; Di Paolo et al.,
2011; Moran, 2011)
• As a demonstration of a fruitful methodological dialogue
between simple agent simulation models and empirical
research on sensorimotor behavior (Beer, 2008; Husbands,
2009; Rohde, 2009; Di Paolo et al., 2011; Negrello, 2011)
The above-listed points are primarily derived from the main
result of the study that, under certain conditions, coordinated
interaction between humans can emerge. However, as will be
detailed below, it is more difficult to interpret what, if anything,
this finding implies for human social cognition and experience.
DOES PERCEPTUAL CROSSING CONSTITUTE SOCIAL COGNITION?
In a recent paper, De Jaegher et al. (2010) have referred to the per-
ceptual crossing experiment (Auvray et al., 2009) and its model
(Di Paolo et al., 2008) as a prime example of how interaction can
constitute social cognition, rather than to play just a contextual
or enabling role for social cognition. They argue that “the varia-
tion in the number of clicks is attributable only to the differences
in the stability of the coupling and not to individual strategies”
(De Jaegher et al., 2010). In their understanding, the distinction
between interaction as an enabling factor and as a constitutive
factor is based on the fact that participants cannot consciously
distinguish between the other and the shadow image; with-
out self-organization of coordination, perceptual discrimination
would be at chance level.
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This line of argument has been criticized by Herschbach
(2012) for a number of reasons. Herschbach argues that the
difference between enabling and constitutive factors for social
cognition is neither clearly defined nor demonstrated using exam-
ples. De Jaegher et al. (2010) refer to the original perceptual
crossing study (Auvray et al., 2009) and its model (Di Paolo et al.,
2008, first model) as an example where interaction constitutes
social cognition. They then refer to Iizuka et al.’s (2009, 2012a)
study on interaction with a recording as an example where inter-
action merely enables social cognition, but does not constitute
it. In this model (see also Iizuka and DiPaolo, 2007), the agents
scan the recording but eventually disengage, while they remain
in indefinite interaction with another agent. Herschbach is puz-
zled about the nature of this divide and argues that as “the same
kind of explanation in terms of the collective dynamics of the
social interaction is given in both cases, it is unclear why the lan-
guage of constitution is only applied to one but not the other”
(Herschbach, 2012).
We remain agnostic as to whether or not perceptual cross-
ing constitutes social cognition. The truth of such a statement
depends on the definition of social cognition that is adopted and
is thus open to interpretation. Having said that, we would like to
point out, in response to Herschbach’s (2012) criticism, that there
is an important difference between the two models presented in
Di Paolo et al. (2008), which respectively model Auvray et al.’s
(2009) perceptual crossing experiment and its variant studied by
Iizuka et al. (2009, 2012a). The original perceptual crossing exper-
iment (Auvray et al., 2009) is deliberately designed in such a way
that interaction with the shadow image is inherently unstable. In
Iizuka et al.’s (2009, 2012a) experiment, on the other hand, the
task and environment afford the possibility of a one-sided coor-
dination with a recording. Indeed, Iizuka et al. (2009); Iizuka
et al. (2012a) report that only 4 out of 10 human couples were
able to make the distinction between recordings and live interac-
tions. All of the participants had to develop turn-taking strategies
in order to assess—individually—whether the interaction is live.
Therefore, what matters most for solving the task in Iizuka et al.’s
(2009, 2012a) experiment is an individual agent’s capacity to
modulate coupling so as to engage or disengage. What matters
in Auvray et al.’s (2009) experiment is the environment and the
mutual search behavior; live interaction and the solution to the
task then emerge automatically. This difference may be the reason
why De Jaegher et al. (2010) see interaction as merely enabling
in Iizuka et al.’s (2009, 2012a) study and as constitutive in the
original study (Auvray et al., 2009).
Another line of criticism has been voiced by Michael (2011,
Michael and Overgaard, 2012). He argues that, in a hypotheti-
cal variant of Auvray et al.’s (2009) experiment, external events
could be used to orchestrate a participant’s behavior so as to
bias the frequency with which a mobile object or the partner
are encountered. In his example, the participants would receive
electric shocks whenever they move away from a certain zone
of proximity with the partner. The same main result would
consequently be observed. He argues that if perceptual cross-
ing is an example of social cognition, the electric shock based
hypothetical variation would also have to be seen as an exam-
ple of social interaction. Another argument is that at least the
detection of animacy is to be attributed to individual partici-
pants, as the relative click rate for the fixed object varies from
that of the shadow image and the other. Michael feels that this
fact is under-appreciated in the interactionist explanation of the
paradigm. His third argument is that it is unclear whether the
perceptual crossing paradigm is a good example for social cogni-
tion in general and that, if not, one should be careful to generalize
from the results.
All three of these critical points can be addressed by pointing
out that Michael’s (2011, Michael and Overgaard, 2012) idea of
social cognition appears to differ fundamentally from De Jaegher
et al.’s (2010). This is best illustrated by juxtaposing Michael and
Overgaard’s (2012) statement that
“for the interaction to constitute social cognition in this sense
in the experiment, it would presumably have to constitute the
processes by which social judgments are formed” (Michael and
Overgaard, 2012)
to De Jaegher and Di Paolo’s (2007) notion of “participatory
sense-making” in an enactive theory of social cognition. Such a
theory
“would be concerned with defining the social in terms of the
embodiment of interaction, in terms of shifting and emerging lev-
els of autonomous identity, and in terms of joint sense-making
and its experience” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007).
The former approach places emphasis on what makes an
individual perform a click, whereas the latter places emphasis
on the interaction process. The former perspective sees no dif-
ference between externally orchestrated perceptual crossing and
emergence of coordination; for the latter, the emergent coor-
dination process and the mechanism underlying it makes all
the difference. The former seeks to emphasize what is left of
individual strategies in the experiment, the latter seeks to empha-
size the importance of emergent processes in interaction. The
former attempts to isolate the perceptual crossing experiment
as an odd case and establish differences with other examples
of social cognition; the latter strives to integrate it and seek
commonalities or similar processes in other domains of social
cognition.
Coincidentally, this very debate about how a choice of
paradigm will determine whether the perceptual crossing exper-
iment is perceived to “count” as an example of social cognition
has been discussed as a hypothetical debate in Rohde and Stewart
(2008). The authors suggest that internalists, who believe that
(social) cognition is essentially down to what happens inside the
brain of an individual, will consider the experiment as “cheat-
ing.” Michael (2011) notes several times that the emergence of
coordination is an obvious consequence of participants using
the same strategy, as if it was a shortcoming of the experi-
ment, rather than a deliberate feature. He also states that emer-
gent coordination is fully explained by the individuals’ search
strategy. This line of argument neglects the role of the virtual
environment in producing these results. Manipulations of the
environment could destroy participants’ tendency to synchro-
nize in perceptual crossing. For instance, Ware (2011) showed
how the introduction of a delay in an interaction environment
can lead to the break-down of otherwise stable coordination.
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These statements reveal strong internalist premises underlying
Michael’s (2011) argument, which in turn means that the dis-
agreement with De Jaegher et al.’s (2010) interactionist per-
spective is of a much more fundamental nature than a dis-
agreement of the exact significance of the perceptual crossing
paradigm.
Rohde and Stewart (2008) conclude without a recommenda-
tion for a paradigm or perspective. They suggest instead that
the debate about which explanation is most useful, or suits our
intuitions best, should be informed by the scientific study of
the underlying mechanisms. We second this recommendation,
and want to stress that both the study of the mechanisms of
coordination and of individual judgment deserve attention. The
mechanisms of coordination matter because external orchestra-
tion by electric shocks is not the same thing as self-organized
coordination. It in no way resembles the process of catching
someone’s eye in passing, which, similar to the perceptual crossing
experiment, is a result of two people meeting in active percep-
tual pursuit. However, the individual strategies and how they are
modulated by interaction should not be swept under the car-
pet, as they will both influence interaction and be influenced by
interaction.
The reviewed research on perceptual crossing shows how both
questions can be addressed as part of a minimalist and interac-
tionist agenda based on experiments in perceptual crossing. The
experiment by Auvray et al. (2009) focuses its attention on the
necessary ingredients for the emergence of coordination and is
complemented by Iizuka et al.’s (2009, 2012a) experiment that
focuses on what an individual can do to modulate interaction
and improve discriminability. This complementary approach can
serve as an example of how to approach problems of social cog-
nition in general. Even if, for any particular example of social
cognition, one perspective or the other may be more appropri-
ate, only an alteration and combination of the two perspectives
will allow us to tell the full story, whether or not coordinated
interaction is seen as constitutive for social cognition.
PERCEPTUAL CROSSING AND EMOTION
Lenay (2010) recently mentioned the perceptual crossing study in
the context of proposing a theory of emotion. Lenay draws on
a number of different sources, including phenomenology, psy-
chology, and even literature, to determine what is necessary in
order to experience an encounter with another person as emo-
tional and touching. He argues that for this emotional experience
to occur, and even to experience oneself or another as subjects
in the first place, it is necessary to engage in perceptual crossing.
A further requirement was to be ignorant about how one’s sen-
sors and motors are linked up, which one learns in interaction
with the other. The kind of self-emergent dynamics of coordina-
tion that occur in the perceptual crossing experiment are used as
a proof of concept in this article, to illustrate the kind of processes
he refers to.
It can be anecdotally reported that participants in the percep-
tual crossing experiment tend to enjoy the interaction with one
another. Declerck et al. (2009) describe this as follows: “this situ-
ation [. . .] is immediately richer in an emotional sense and users
spontaneously engage in pursuit games or ‘dialogues’ that take
the form of little dances in the shared numerical space.” (Declerck
et al., 2009, our translation). In the present context of clarify-
ing the exact significance of the results on perceptual crossing
reported by Auvray et al. (2009), we want to stress that these
observations are to date anecdotal. The main result neither sup-
ports nor contradicts this hypothesis. This remark should not
be seen as a reservation against the theory proposed. Studies on
sensory substitution give reason to believe that the sharing of
a same perceptual prosthesis can be used to co-constitute and
share an experience of value (e.g., Lenay et al., 2003; Auvray and
Myin, 2009; Declerck et al., 2009; Bird, 2011). However, more
targeted research will be necessary to understand the possible role
of social interaction and communication in the affective experi-
ence of perceptual crossing. Lenay et al. have started research into
this direction (cf. Deschamps et al., 2012; for a short description).
THE ROAD AHEAD
We have learned a lot from studies using the perceptual cross-
ing paradigm already, and we expect to learn much more in
the future, given the numerous ongoing lines of research that
build upon it (cf. Section “What do the Results on Perceptual
Crossing Imply?”). There are still many open issues in trying
to understand even the most fundamental questions of how we
perceive, interact with, and understand each other. What the
perceptual crossing paradigm has shown is that there can be coor-
dination between humans, a self-organized coupling of mutual
perceptual exploration, that occurs without an explicit recogni-
tion process, as humans are equally likely to click when meeting
the other and when meeting their shadow. The perceptual cross-
ing paradigm is the simplest paradigm we know that generates
such online coordination. Computational models have shown
that simple neural network controllers can explain these results
if agents are coupled online. They exploit the dynamic stability
conditions of situated and embodied interaction, rather than pas-
sively parsing “social stimuli.” The simplicity of the paradigm,
as well as the robustness of the results, make a strong case
that similar processes of self-organized coordination between
humans should be abundant in real-life interaction scenarios.
Therefore, the natural way to implement a system capable of
social interaction and social cognition would be to teach it to
work with and modulate the natural occurrence of coordination.
The assumption that this is what humans do is central in the
interactionist turn.
One major open question for interactionist research on social
cognition is the study of how the underlying processes are neu-
rally implemented. There is a growing body of research investigat-
ing the neural correlates of social cognition and online interaction
(e.g., Kampe et al., 2003; Amodio and Frith, 2006; Schilbach
et al., 2006, 2010; Fujii et al., 2008, 2009). For instance, Schilbach
et al.’s (2010) study highlighted the neural activities that are
specifically involved in the sharing of a perceptual experience
with a virtual character. In future research, the minimalism of
the perceptual crossing paradigm will be a key advantage for
neuro-imaging, given that the investigated processes can be very
carefully controlled and minimal changes in action-perception
can be applied that alter the engagement and perception of agency
in a participant.
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In the perceptual crossing experiment, there is no conscious
distinction between the other and her shadow image, as the equal
click rates for the other and the shadow reveal. This makes it pos-
sible to use the perceptual crossing paradigm to approach the
question of social cognition from the other way around. Instead
of starting from an individual’s perception of social interaction, as
it is usually done, in perceptual crossing experiments, one starts
with a stable interaction without conscious recognition. From
there, it can be asked what has to be added in order to obtain
perception of agency at an individual level. Several routes can be
pursued in this endeavor.
Lenay et al.’s (Lenay and Stewart, 2012; cf. Section “Extensions
andModels of the Paradigm”) results on classification of encoun-
ters marked by different sounds suggests the possibility that,
in variants of the perceptual crossing experiment, there could
be some level of individual discrimination capacity. More fine-
grained measures of participants’ conscious recognition capacity
could be obtained, for instance, by measuring confidence rat-
ings after each click (e.g., Dienes, 2004) or by asking forced-
choice judgments after each encounter. Thereby, individual dis-
crimination capacities could be studied parametrically and dif-
ferent facets of consciously perceived agency could be cap-
tured.
Another approach would be to change the stability conditions
of the task in order to increase task difficulty and demand dis-
criminative actions from the participant. The research performed
by Iizuka et al. (2009, 2012a) that requires participants to dis-
tinguish between recordings and live interactions can be seen as
a venture into this direction. As participants can get trapped in
one-sided coordination, the task requires them to learn probing
and turn-taking strategies over several trials in order to modu-
late the dynamics of perceptual crossing and generate a basis for
individual discrimination.
There is a third route to pursue that would appear to be
so obvious that it is surprising that research in this direction
is only just starting. Combining the research strands on behav-
ioral experiments with humans (Section “Further Experiments
on Perceptual Crossing”) with the strand of computational mod-
eling (Section “Robot Simulation Models”), one can pair off
humans and machines and study their interaction. Thereby, one
can exactly control the kind of dynamics that a participant
can engage in and how they influence her clicking behavior.
This comes down to a minimal “Turing test” (Turing, 1950).
The concept of a “Turing test” dates back to the co-inventor
of computers, Alan Turing, who proposed to make a human
speak to a computer via a digital interface and use the human
judgment—is it a machine or another human?—as an empir-
ical test for artificial intelligence. Using the same approach in
the perceptual crossing paradigm will allow testing experimen-
tally what it is about an animated and responsive stimulus that
makes a human perceive a source of stimulation as another
intentional entity. It will also reveal what it is that allows stable
interaction.
Lenay’s group have recently started testing humans against
simulated agents with different control strategies, finding an
overall difficulty in distinguishing artificial agents from human
partners, as well as a seemingly paradoxical trend to rate agents
with simple control strategies as more human than those with
more sophisticated control strategies (cf. Deschamps et al., 2012).
A similar line of research, yet with a very different paradigm,
was explored by Pfeiffer et al. (2011). This experiment used a
social gaze paradigm where participants’ eyes movements were
recorded in order to induce an anthropomorphic virtual char-
acter to respond in real time to the participants’ fixations (see
also Schilbach et al., 2010; Wilms et al., 2010). Participants had
to determine if a virtual character’s gaze behavior was controlled
by another person or a by computer program and were instructed
to assume either a cooperative, a competitive, or a naïve strategy
from the potential interaction partner. The study found that the
attribution of intentionality is influenced by the presumed dispo-
sitions (i.e., naïve, cooperative or competitive) of the interacting
entity as well as by the contingency of interaction. These stud-
ies already demonstrate the advantages of being able to control
the interactive properties of an interaction partner in order to
observe how this influences the behavior and perception of the
other partner.
The perceptual crossing paradigm is but one example of an
ongoing shift of paradigm in social cognition. Researchers start
to pay attention to the emergent dynamics of live interaction that
have thus far been neglected. This interactionist turn, again, can
be seen as part of a more general trend in cognitive science to take
the embodied interaction with an environment and the emergent
properties of situated sensorimotor behavior seriously. These new
approaches are characterized by the use of dynamical system’s
theory as a tool to describe the properties of systems behaving
in a closed sensorimotor loop and by paying close attention to
the influence that the body and the environment have on behav-
ior and cognition. The cost of such a more encompassing view is
that researchers are faced with systems of remarkable complexity
and quickly encounter the limits of current mathematical tools.
This is why it is important to have simple paradigms, such as
the perceptual crossing paradigm. Using restricted behavior in
a minimal virtual environment, the complexity of the behavior
to be explained could be scaled down to manageable dimen-
sions. The perceptual crossing results demonstrate the power
and importance of online interactions in an intelligible way. The
variables measured in perceptual crossing—e.g., stability condi-
tions, amount of turn-taking, rules of sensorimotor contingency,
inter-participant correlation of behavior—may be very differ-
ent from those used traditionally in social cognition research.
For some such measures it may at first not even be particu-
larly clear how they can be related to existing individually based
variables, such as perceptual judgments and inferential capaci-
ties. Yet, they demonstrate on a small scale how an explanatory
interactionist story can evolve. We are curious what a future,
gradual enrichment of this simplest of online paradigms will
reveal.
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